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Abstract. A Webview embeds a fully-edged browser in a mobile application
and allows that application to expose a custom interface to JavaScript code. This
is a popular technique to build so-called hybrid applications, but it circumvents
the usual security model of the browser: any malicious JavaScript code injected
into the Webview gains access to the custom interface and can use it to manipu-
late the device or exltrate sensitive data. In this paper, we present an approach
to systematically evaluate the possible impact of code injection attacks against
Webviews using static information ow analysis. Our key idea is that we can
make reasoning about JavaScript semantics unnecessary by instrumenting the
application with a model of possible attacker behavior—the BabelView. We eval-
uate our approach on 25,000 apps from various Android marketplaces, nding
10,808 potential vulnerabilities in 4,997 apps. Taken together, the apps reported
as problematic have over 3 billion installations worldwide. We manually validate
a random sample of 50 apps and estimate that our fully automated analysis
achieves a precision of 81% at a recall of 89%.
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1 Introduction
The integration of web technologies in mobile applications enables rapid cross-platform
development and provides a uniform user experience across devices. Web content is
usually rendered by a Webview, a user interface component with an embedded browser
engine (WebView in Android, UIWebView in iOS). Webviews are widely used: in 2015,
about 85% of applications on Google’s Play Store contained one [17]. Cross-platform
frameworks such as Apache Cordova, which allow apps to be written entirely in
HTML and JavaScript, have contributed to this high rate of adoption and given rise
to the notion of hybrid applications. Even otherwise native applications often embed
Webviews for displaying login screens or additional web content.
Unfortunately, Webviews bring new security threats [15–17,24]. While the Android
Webview uses WebKit to render the page, the security model can be modied by app
developers. Whereas standalone browsers enforce strong isolation, Webviews can
intentionally poke holes in the browser sandbox to provide access to app- and device-
specic features via a JavaScript interface. For instance, a hybrid banking application
could provide access to account details when loading the bank’s website in a Webview,
or it could relay access to contacts to ll in payee details.
For assessing the overall security of an application, it is necessary to understand
the implications of its JavaScript interface. When designing the interface, a developer
thinks of the functionality required by her own, trusted JavaScript code executing in
the Webview. However, there are several ways that an attacker can inject malicious
JavaScript and access the interface [7, 17].
The observation that exposed interfaces can pose a security risk was made in previ-
ous work [4,9]; however, not all interfaces are dangerous or oer meaningful control to
an attacker. The intuition is that agging up—or even removing from the marketplace—
any applications with an exposed JavaScript interface would be an excessive measure.
By assessing the risk posed by an application, we can focus attention on the most
dangerous cases and provide meaningful feedback to developers.
We rely on static analysis to evaluate the potential impact of an attack against
Webviews, with respect to the nature of the JavaScript interfaces. Our key idea is that
we can instrument an application with a model of potential attacker behavior that
over-approximates the possible information ow semantics of an attack. In particular,
we instrument the target app and replace Android’s Webview and its descendants with
a specially crafted BabelView that simulates arbitrary interactions with the JavaScript
interface. A subsequent information ow analysis on the instrumented application
then yields new ows made possible by the attacker model, which gives an indication
of the potential impact. Together with an evaluation of the diculty of mounting an
attack, this can provide an indication of the overall security risk.
Instrumenting the target application allows us to build on existing mature tools
for Android ow analysis. This design makes our approach particularly robust, which
is important on a quickly changing platform such as Android. In addition, since our
instrumentation is over-approximate, we inherit any soundness guarantees oered
by the ow analysis used. Independently of us, Yang et al. [31] developed a related
approach to address the same problem, but with a closed source system relying on a
custom static analysis. Our paper makes the following contributions:
– We introduce BabelView, a novel approach to evaluate the impact of code injec-
tion attacks against Webviews based on information ow analysis of applications
instrumented with an attacker model. BabelView is implemented using Soot [27]
and is available as open source.
– We analyze 25,000 applications from the Google Play Store to evaluate our approach
and survey the current state of Webview security in Android. Our analysis reports
10,808 potential vulnerabilities in 4,997 apps, which together are reported to have
more than 3 billion installations. We validate the results on a random sample of 50
applications and estimate the precision to be 81% with a recall of 89%, conrming
the practical viability of our approach.
In the remainder of the paper, we briey explain Android WebViews (§2) and
introduce our approach (§3) before describing the details of our implementation (§4).
We evaluate BabelView and report the results of our Android study (§5) and discuss
limitations (§6). Finally, we present related work (§7) and conclude (§8).
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2 Android WebViews
To provide the necessary context for the remainder of the paper, we rst introduce key
aspects of Android Webviews. An Android application can instantiate a Webview by
calling its constructor or by declaring it in the Activity XML layout, from where the
framework will create it automatically. The specics of how the app interacts with the
Webview object depend on which approach it follows; in either case, a developer can
extend Android’s WebView class to override methods and customize its behavior.
The WebView class oers mechanisms for interaction between the app and the web
content in both directions. Java code can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the
Webview by passing a URL with the “javascript:” pseudo-protocol to the loadUrl
method of a Webview instance. Any code passed in this way is executed in the context
of the current page, just like if it were typed into a standalone browser’s address bar.
For the other direction, and to let JavaScript code in the Webview call Java methods, the
Webview allows to create custom interfaces. Any methods of an object (the interface
object) passed to the WebView.addJavascriptInterface method that are tagged with the
@JavascriptInterface annotation1 (the interface methods) are exported to the global
JavaScript namespace in the Webview. For instance, the following example makes a
single Java method available to JavaScript:
LocationUtils lUtils = new LocationUtils();
wView.addJavascriptInterface(lUtils, "JSlUtils");
public class LocationUtils {
@JavascriptInterface
public String getLocation() {
do_something();
}
}
Here, LocationUtils is bound to a global JavaScript object JSlUtils in the Webview
wView. JavaScript code can access the annotated Java method getLocation() by calling
JSlUtils.getLocation().
The Webview’s JavaScript interface mechanism enforces a policy of which Java
methods are available to call from the JavaScript context. Developers of hybrid apps are
left to decide which functionality to expose in an interface that is more security-critical
than it appears. It is easy for a developer to erroneously assume the JavaScript interface
to be a trusted internal interface, shared only between the Java and JavaScript portions
of the same app. In reality, it is more akin to a public API, considering the relative
ease with which malicious JavaScript code can make its way into a Webview (see §3.1).
Therefore, care must be taken to restrict the interface as much as possible and to secure
the delivery of web content into the Webview. In this work we provide a way for
developers and app store maintainers to detect applications with insecure interfaces
susceptible to abuse; our study in §5 conrms that this is a widespread phenomenon.
1 The @JavascriptInterface annotation was introduced in API level 17 to address a security
vulnerability that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code via the Java reection API [19].
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3 Overview
We now introduce our approach by laying out the attacker model (§3.1), describing our
instrumentation-based model for information ow analysis (§3.2), and discussing how
the instrumentation preserves the application semantics (§3.3).
3.1 Attacker Model
Our overall goal is to identify high-impact vulnerabilities in Android applications. Our
insight is that injection vulnerabilities are dicult to avoid with current mainstream
web technologies, and that their presence does not justify blocking an app from being
distributed to users. Indeed, any standalone browser that allows loading content via
insecure HTTP has this vulnerability (while calling this a “vulnerability” may be
controversial, it clearly has security implications and has led to an increasing adoption
of HTTPS by default). The ubiquity of advertisement libraries in Android apps further
increases the likelihood of foreign JavaScript code gaining access to JavaScript interfaces.
Following this insight, we aim to pinpoint the risk of using a Webview that is embedded
in an app. To do this, we assess the degrees of freedom an attacker gains from injecting
code into a Webview with a JavaScript interface, which determines the potential impact
of an injection attack.
Consequently, the attacker model for our analysis consists of arbitrary code injection
into the HTML page or referenced scripts loaded in the Webview. In our evaluation, we
actively try to inject JavaScript into the Webview—e.g., as man in the middle (see §5.5).
We note, however, that other channels are available to manipulate the code loaded
into a Webview, including malicious advertisements or site-specic cross-site-scripting
attacks [4, 9, 10]. To abuse the JavaScript interface, the attacker then only requires the
names of the interface methods, which can be obtained through reverse-engineering.
Note that even a man in the middle becomes more powerful with access to the JavaScript
interface: the interface can allow the attacker to manipulate and retrieve application and
device data that would not normally be visible to the adversary. For instance, consider a
remote access application with an interface method getProperty(key), which retrieves
the value mapped to a key in the application’s properties. Without accessing the
interface, an attacker may only ever observe calls to getProperty with, say, the keys
"favorites" and "compression", but the attacker would be free to also use the function
to retrieve the value for the key "privateKey".
3.2 Instrumenting for Information Flow
Our approach is based on static information ow (or taint) analysis. We aim to nd
potentially dangerous information ows from injected JavaScript into sensitive parts
of the Java-based app and vice-versa. At rst glance, this appears to require expensive
cross-language static analysis, as recently proposed for hybrid apps [5, 13]. However,
we can avoid analyzing JavaScript code because our attacker model assumes that the
JavaScript code is controlled by the attacker. Therefore, we want to model the actions
performed by any possible JavaScript code, and not that of developer-provided code
that is supposed to execute in the Webview.
To this end, we perform information ow analysis on the application instrumented
with a representation of the attacker model in Java, such that the result is an over-
approximation of all possible actions of the attacker (we discuss alternative solutions
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Algorithm 1 Information ow attacker model
1: procedure Attacker
2: while true do
3: choose iface ∈ JS-interfaces
4: result← iface(source(), source(), . . . )
5: sink(result)
in §6). We replace the Android WebView class (and custom subclasses) with a BabelView,
a Webview that simulates an attacker specic to the app’s JavaScript interfaces. We
then apply a ow-, eld-, and object-sensitive taint analysis [2] to detect information
ows that read or write potentially sensitive information as a result of an injection
attack.
The BabelView provides tainted input sources to all possible sequences of interface
methods and connects their return values to sinks, as shown in Algorithm 1. Here,
source() and sink() are stubs that refer to sources and sinks of the underlying taint
analysis. The non-deterministic enumeration of sequences of interface method invoca-
tions is necessary since we employ a ow-sensitive taint analysis. This way, our model
also covers situations where the information ow depends on a specic ordering of
methods; for instance, consider the following example:
String id;
@JavascriptInterface
public void initialize() {
this.id = IMEI();
}
@JavascriptInterface
public String getId() {
return this.id;
}
Here, a call to initialize (line 4) must precede any invocation of getId (line 8) to
cause a leak of sensitive information (the IMEI). The ow-sensitive analysis correctly
distinguishes dierent orders of invocation, which helps to reduce false positives. In the
BabelView, the loop in Algorithm 1 coupled with non-deterministic choice forces the
analysis to join abstract states and over-approximate the result of all possible invocation
orders.
Figure 1 illustrates our approach. We annotate certain methods in the Android API
as sources and sinks (see §4.4), which may be accessed by methods in the JavaScript
interface. The BabelView includes both a source passing data into the interface methods
and a sink receiving their return values to allow detecting ows both from and to
JavaScript. The source corresponds to any data injected by the attacker, and the sink to
any method an attacker could use to exltrate information, e.g., a simple web request.
3.3 Preserving Semantics
Our instrumentation eliminates the requirement to perform a cross-language taint
analysis and moves all reasoning into the Java domain. However, we must make sure
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Fig. 1. BabelView models ows between the attacker and sensitive sources and sinks in the
Android API that cross the JavaScript interface.
that, apart from the attacker model, the instrumentation preserves the original applica-
tion’s information ow semantics. In particular, we need to integrate the execution of
the attacker model into the model of Android’s application life cycle used as the basis
of the taint analysis [2]. We solve this by overriding the methods used to load web
content into the Webview (such as loadUrl() and loadData()) and modifying them
to also call our attacker model (Algorithm 1). This is the earliest point at which the
Webview can schedule the execution of any injected JavaScript code. The BabelView
thus acts as a proxy simulating the eects of malicious JavaScript injected into loaded
web content.
As the BabelView interacts only with the JavaScript interface methods, it does
not aect the application’s static information ow semantics in any other way than
an actual JavaScript injection would. Obviously, this is not necessarily true for other
semantics: for example, the instrumented application would likely crash if it were
executed on an emulator or real device.
4 BabelView
In this section, we explain the dierent phases of our analysis. Figure 2 provides a high-
level overview: in Phase 1 (§4.1), we perform a static analysis to retrieve all interface
objects and methods, and associate them to the respective Webviews. In Phase 2 (§4.2),
we generate the BabelView, and, in Phase 3 (§4.3), we instrument the target application
with it. In Phase 4 (§4.4), we run the taint ow analysis on the resulting applications
and nally, in Phase 5 (§4.5), we analyze the results for ows involving the BabelView.
We implemented our static analysis and instrumentation using the Soot frame-
work [27]; our information ow analysis relies on FlowDroid [2]. Overall, our system
adds about 6,000 LoC to both platforms.
4.1 Phase 1: Interface Analysis
As the rst step of our analysis, we statically analyze the target application to gather
information about its Webviews and JavaScript interfaces. The goal of this stage is to
compute a mapping from Webview classes to classes of interface objects that may be
added to them at any point during execution of the app.
6
Phase 1: 
Interface Analysis
Instrumented 
APK
Phase 2 and 3: 
Generation and 
Instrumentation
Phase 4: 
Flow Analysis
Plain APK
Phase 5:
Analysis 
Refinement
BabelView Instrumentation
Fig. 2. Phases of our analysis.
Using Soot, we can generate the application call graph and precisely resolve
callers and callees. We iterate through all classes and methods, identifying all calls to
addJavascriptInterface, from where we then extract Webviews that will hold interface
objects. We make sure to treat inheritance and polymorphism soundly in this stage,
e.g., where parent classes are used in variable declarations. We illustrate our approach
to handle this on the following code example:
class FrameworkBridge {
@JavascriptInterface
public int foo() {...}
}
class MyBridge extends FrameworkBridge {
@JavascriptInterface
public int bar() {...}
}
class MyWebView extends WebView {...}
void initInterface(WebView aWebView, FrameworkBridge aBridge) {
aWebView.addJavascriptInterface(aBridge, "Android");
}
...
MyWebView mWebView = new MyWebView();
initInterface(mWebView, new MyBridge());
...
The code is adding the interface MyBridge to mWebView, an instance of MyWebView. The
method initInterface is a wrapper (say, from a hybrid app framework) that contains
the actual call to addJavascriptInterface. When processing the call, we extract the
types of aWebView and aBridge from their parameter declarations. For the Webview, we
must process all descendants of its declared class to include the types of all possible
instances. For aWebView, this means we must instrument all descendants (including
anonymous classes) of WebView, i.e., WebView and MyWebView.
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Similarly, we are interested in the type of aBridge. Again, we must iterate over
all subclasses of its declared type FrameworkBridge to ensure capturing the bridge
added at runtime. However, since addJavascriptInterface is of the unconstrained type
Object, this could potentially include all classes. Therefore, we restrict processing to
just those subclasses that contain at least one @JavascriptInterface annotation. As a
result, we obtain a superset of all interface objects that can be added by this method,
i.e., FrameworkBridge and MyBridge.
Continuing the example, we now have the mapping from Webview classes to
classes of interface objects as {WebView↦ {FrameworkBridge, MyBridge}, MyWebView↦
FrameworkBridge, MyBridge}}. Any additional occurrences of addJavascriptInterface
will be processed analogously and the results added to the set. Because the analysis
in this phase is conservative in collecting compatible types, the result is a sound over-
approximation of the mapping of Webviews to JavaScript interfaces that can occur at
runtime (modulo inaccuracies from dynamic code, see §6).
4.2 Phase 2: Generating the BabelView
We generate a BabelView class for each WebView in the mapping. Each BabelView denes
a subclass of its WebView (we remove the parent’s final modier if necessary) and
overrides all of its parent’s constructors so it can be used as a drop-in replacement. We
make the associated interface objects explicitly available in each BabelView. To this end,
we override the addJavascriptInterface method to store the interface objects passed
to it in instance elds of the BabelView class.
To implement the attacker model, the BabelView needs to override all methods
that load external resources and could thus be susceptible to JavaScript injection.
In particular, we override loadUrl, postUrl, loadData, and loadDataWithBaseURL. We
automatically generate these methods as a call to their super implementation followed
by a Java implementation of the attacker model, Algorithm 1. Finally, the BabelView is
equipped with two stub methods, leak and taintSource, representing a tainted sink
and a tainted input, respectively.
4.3 Phase 3: Instrumentation
In the next phase, we instrument the application to replace its Webviews with our
generated BabelView instances. The instrumentation is case-dependent on how the
Webview is instantiated (see §2): if it is created via an ordinary constructor call, that
constructor is replaced with the corresponding constructor of its BabelView class. If
the Webview is created via the Activity XML layout, our instrumentation searches for
calls to findViewById, which the app uses to obtain the Webview instance (e.g., in order
to add the JavaScript interface to it). To identify the calls to findViewById returning a
Webview, our instrumenter identies explicit casts to a Webview class. Because we do
not parse the XML layout itself, we arbitrarily choose one of the constructors of the
BabelView. While this could potentially be a source of false positives or negatives, it
would require a highly specic and unconventional design of the Webview class.
4.4 Phase 4: Information Flow Analysis
We perform a static information ow analysis on the instrumented application to
identify information ows involving the attacker model. Since our approach relies on
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instrumenting the application under analysis, it is agnostic to the specic ow analysis.
We decided to rely on the open source implementation of FlowDroid [2], inheriting its
context-, ow-, eld-, and object-sensitivity, as well as its life cycle-awareness.
Sources and sinks are selected corresponding to sensitive information sources and
device functions, modied from the set provided by SuSi [22]. We further include the
sources and sinks used in the BabelView classes.
The information ow analysis abstracts the semantics of Android framework meth-
ods. FlowDroid uses a simple modeling system (the TaintWrapper), where any method
can either (i) be a source, (ii) be a sink, (iii) taint its object if any argument is tainted and
return a tainted value if its object is tainted, (iv) clear taint from its object, (v) ignore
any taint in its arguments or its object. We extended the TaintWrapper with several
models that were relevant for the types of vulnerabilities we were interested in, e.g., to
precisely capture the creation of Intents from tainted URIs.
Finally, information ows indicating that sensitive functionality is exposed via the
JavaScript interface are identied, triggering an alarm showing a potential vulnerability.
For instance, consider an Intent object initialized to perform phone calls. A ow from
source to putExtra will taint the Intent; if it is then passed as an input to startActivity,
an attacker can perform calls on behalf of the user.
4.5 Phase 5: Analysis Renement
Preferences. Taint analysis cannot distinguish between individual key-value pairs in
a map. Preferences are a commonly used map type in Android apps that often store
sensitive information as a key-value pair. After the information ow analysis, we rene
our results by statically deriving values of keys for access to preferences. Our denition
of sources and sinks allows to identify both ows from and to the Preferences. Given
two ows, one inserting and the other retrieving values from Preferences, we are
interested in understanding whether (i) the value is of the same type and (ii) the access
key is the same. If these conditions are met, we have identied a potential leak via
Preferences. To determine the key values, we modeled StringBuilder and implemented
an intra-procedural constant propagation and folding for strings. Finally, if an interface
method allows web content to interact with a preferences object, BabelView reports
all keys used to access it, since preferences can be used to store sensitive values. This
allows to inspect ows to or from preferences entries, even if these values are not
dependent on a specic source in the Android API. We match key names against a
list of suspicious entries, which can highlight potential leaks of sensitive app-specic
information (see §5.7). In the same manner, we also highlight suspiciously named
interface methods.
Intents. Flow analysis can detect situations where Intent creation depends on tainted
input. However, it tells nothing about the type of the Intent created, as this depends
on specic parameters, e.g, those provided to its setAction method. For interpreting
results, it is important, however, to know the action of an Intent that can be controlled
by an attacker. For any ow that reaches the startActivity sink, we perform an inter-
procedural backward dependency analysis to the point of the initialization of the Intent.
If the Intent action is not set within the constructor, we perform a forward analysis
from the constructor to nd calls to setAction on the Intent object. The analysis may
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fail where actions are dened within intent lters (XML denitions) or through other
built-in methods. To increase precision in our inter-procedural analysis, we ensure that
the call-stack is consistent with an invocation through the interface method; i.e., the
interface method that triggered the ow must be reachable.
5 Evaluation
We now present our evaluation of BabelView and the results of our study of vulnerabil-
ities in Android applications. Below, we explain our methodology (§5.1) and ask the
following research questions to evaluate our approach:
1. Can BabelView successfully process real-world applications? We conduct a
study on a randomly selected set of applications from the AndroZoo [1] dataset
and provide a breakdown of all results (§5.2).
2. Does BabelView expose real vulnerabilities? We discuss some of the vulnera-
ble apps in more detail to understand what an attacker can achieve under what
conditions (§5.7).
3. What are the precision and recall of our analysis? We manually validate a
random sample of apps, estimating overall precision and recall (§5.4).
We also shed light on the current state of Webview security on Android with the
following questions:
4. How frequent are dierent types of alarms? We report results per alarm,
which provides an insight into the prevalence of potential vulnerabilities (§5.3).
5. Are there types of potential vulnerabilities that are likely to occur in com-
bination? We compute the correlation between alarms raised by our analysis and
analyze our ndings (§5.6).
Unfortunately, we were unable to conduct a direct comparison with BridgeScope, the
work most closely related to ours. Despite helpful communication, the authors were
ultimately unable to share neither their experimental data nor their implementation
with us. In the spirit of open data, we make all our code and data available2.
5.1 Methodology
We obtained our dataset from AndroZoo [1], using the list of applications available
on July 22nd, 2016, when it contained about 4.4 million samples. We downloaded a
random subset of 209,069 apps, and then ltered our dataset for applications containing
a Webview, a call to addJavascriptInterface, and granting permission to access the
Internet. As a result, we obtained 62,674 total applications. Finally, from the obtained
sample, we randomly extracted 25,000 applications found in the Google Play Store,
which we used for our analysis.
We ran BabelView on ve servers: one 32-core with 250GiB of RAM and four 16-core
with 125GiB of RAM. Each application took on average 180 seconds to complete. The
high precision of FlowDroid’s information ow analysis can lead to long processing
time in the order of hours. Therefore, we set a time limit of 15 minutes, which was a
sweet spot in the sense that apps taking longer would often go over an hour. A positive
2 https://github.com/ClaudioRizzo/BabelView
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eect of our instrumentation-based approach is that we benet from improvements
in the underlining ow analysis. Indeed, over the duration of this project, we saw a
noticeable accuracy enhancement from the constant improvements on FlowDroid.
Each application underwent three main phases: (i) BabelView instrumentation, (ii)
FlowDroid analysis on the instrumented app and (iii) analysis of the resulting ows to
identify suspect ows and raise alarms. On the reported applications, we performed
a feasibility analysis. We searched the app for plain http:// URLs and assess the
resilience of the app against injection attacks.
5.2 Applicability
Running our tool chain on the 25,000 target applications resulted in 1,286 general
errors and 3,837 ow analysis timeouts. The remaining 19,877 apps were successfully
analyzed and we obtained the following breakdown: 832 applications had no interface
objects at all or no interface methods in case the target API was version 17 or above;
14,048 applications had no ows involving our attacker model; and 4,997 were reported
as dangerous, i.e., containing ows due to the attacker behavior. This amounts to a rate
of 26.2%. We investigated the reasons for the crashes, and most happened either due to
unexpected byte code that Soot fails to handle or while FlowDroid’s taint analysis was
computing callbacks.
Among applications with interface objects, we also considered those targeting
outdated versions of the Android API, since this is still a common occurrence [18,25,28].
When using Webviews prior to API 17, any app is trivially vulnerable to an arbitrary
code execution disclosed in 20133. Despite targeting an old API version, if compiled
with a newer Android SDK, these applications can still use the @JavascriptInterface
annotation. While the annotation itself does not provide extra security, these apps may
target newer APIs in future releases [24].
5.3 Alarms Triggered
We successfully used BabelView to examine 19,877 applications. We found that 4,997 of
them triggered an alarm (i.e., our analysis reported a potential vulnerability), meaning
that the interface methods could be exploited by foreign JavaScript from injection
or advertisement. Table 1 shows a breakdown of all the alarms we observed in our
analysis. Among the most common alarms, we observed the possibility of writing to
the File System (Write File), capability to start new applications (Start App), violation
of the Same Origin Policy (Frame Confusion) and the possibility of exploiting the old
reection attack due to Android API prior to v17.
Writing File capabilities show the developers’ need for storing app-external data
usually coming from an app-dedicated server. We also observed that many applications
implement advertising libraries which need to open a new application, usually Google
Play Store, to allow the user to download or visualize some information. Unfortunately,
the package name of the application to open is given as input to an interface method,
enabling a possible attacker to control which app to start. Same-Origin-Policy violations
are also very common: this is the case when a loadUrl is invoked with input from
the interface methods, controlling what is loaded in to a frame. As described by Luo
3 https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/webview-addjavascriptinterface-remote-code-
execution/
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Alarm #Apps Alarm #Apps Alarm #Apps
Open File 385 Write File 1,444 Read File 593
TM Leaks 39 Pref. TM Leaks 4 Pref. Connectivity Leaks 4
SQL-lite Leaks 136 SQL-lite Query 438 Pref. SQL-lite Leaks 11
GPS Leaks 43 Pref. GPS Leaks 1 Directly Send SMS 6
Directly Make Calls 19 Call via Intent 314 Email/SMS via Intent 778
Take Picture 7 Download Photo 317 Play Video/Audio 378
Edit Calendar 357 Post to Social 293 Start App 1,321
API prior to 17 1,039 Unknown Intent 1,107 Frame Confusion 1,039
Fetch Class 85 Fetch Constructor 0 Constructor init 13
Fetch Method 85 Method Parameter 622
Table 1.Number of applications per alarm category. Pref. stands for indirect leaks via a Preference
object; TM stands for Telephony Manager.
et al. [15], JavaScript executing in an iframe runs in the context of the main frame,
violating the SOP.
Many applications still target an API version prior to 17 [18, 25, 28], often due to
backwards compatibility or simply due to confusion in declaring the SDK version.
Other alarms involve the possibility to prompt the user with an email or a text message
to send, directly sending an SMS or performing a phone call; prompting the user with
the call dialer; posting content to social network; interacting with the calendar by
creating or editing an event; playing videos or audio; leaking sensitive information like
the device ID or phone numbers (i.e. TM Leaks), GPS position, SQL information, etc.
Finally, we shed light on the possible use of Java Reection inside interface methods.
Fetch Class, Fetch Constructor, Constructor init, Fetch Method and Method Param-
eter are all signs that an attacker controls input used to execute methods via Java
reection. Although these are rare situations and often hard to exploit, they are ex-
tremely high reward for an attacker as they can potentially allow to circumvent the
@JavascriptInterface annotation, leading to arbitrary code execution. We manually
analyzed some applications presenting these alarms and in some cases an attacker
could take control of a method and its parameters, leading to remote code execution.
5.4 Manual Validation
We used manual validation to estimate the accuracy of our analysis. In particular we
sampled and manually analyzed (i.e., reversed and decompiled) 50 applications. We
evaluated two aspects:
1. How accurate is BabelView with respect to each individual alarm it raises?
2. Does BabelView function as an eective alarm system for hybrid apps?
We began checking all types of alarms for each app and we established whether an
alarm was correctly triggered or correctly not triggered. We observed 42 TPs (True Pos-
itives), 10 FPs (False Positives), 1,494 TNs (True Negatives) and 5 FNs (False Negatives).
From this, we can compute a precision of 81% and a recall of 89% for our analysis.
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The results obtained are in line with our expectations. Our instrumentation does
not alter the semantics of applications other than adding a model of attack behavior.
Therefore, our precision depends on the underlining ow analysis. However, more false
positives could be introduced due to the object-insensitivity of our instrumentation—i.e.,
we distinguish types but not instances of Webviews. Similarly, a very low false negative
rate is common for data ow analysis; however, FNs are still possible, mainly due to
incomplete Android framework.
To evaluate BabelView on a per-app basis, we consider a true positive the case
where an app contains at least one potential vulnerability and at least one alarm is
raised. True negatives and false positives/negatives follow accordingly. We observed
19 TPs, 2 FPs, 29 TNs, and 0 FNs, which yields a precision of 90% and a recall of
100%. This suggest that BabelView performs well as an alarm system for potentially
dangerous applications. Even if individual alarms can be false positives, the correlation
of dangerous interfaces appears to leads to highlighted apps being problematic with
high probability. The false negatives that are present when taken per vulnerability
disappear when analyzed on a per app basis.
5.5 Feasibility Analysis
To better understand the feasibility of exploiting potential vulnerabilities highlighted
by BabelView, we measured the diculty of performing an injection attack. To this
end we use a three-step process: (i) we check the application for TLS misuse using
MalloDroid [7]; (ii) we search for hard-coded URLs beginning with http://, suggesting
that web content could be loaded via an insecure channel; and (iii) we actively injected
JavaScript code into Webviews.
MalloDroid reported 61.5% of applications using TLS insecurely and 98.7% of apps
were found hard-coding HTTP URLs. In order to actively inject JavaScript, we stimu-
lated each reported application with 100 Monkey4 events and actively intercepted the
connection (using Bettercap5), trying to execute a JavaScript payload. Moreover, we
set up our own certicate authority and also tried SSL strip attacks. The goal of the
injection was to determine whether the reported interface methods were present in the
Webview. To this end, we generated JavaScript code checking for the presence of the
interface objects reported by the BabelView analysis. We were able to inject JavaScript
in 1,275 applications and in 482 cases we conrmed the presence of the vulnerable
interface object.
5.6 Correlation of Alarms
We were interested in nding correlations among the alarm categories we identied.
This does not only account for common patterns of functionality, but also identies
single alarms that taken together could increase the attack capabilities, e.g., combining
opening and writing of a le results in writing of arbitrary les.
We can see in the correlation matrix in Figure 3 that alarms involving related
functionality tend to be positively correlated (in red). For example, opening and writing
a le; SQL queries and leaks; and operations involving intents such as call via intent,
send email, edit calendar, play video, post to social, and download pictures. While some
4 https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
5 https://www.bettercap.org
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Fig. 3. Correlation matrix of alarms.
correlations are evident, some appear incidental, such as intent calls and playing of
videos. Based on manual inspection (see §5.7), we found that these categories of alarms
often appear together in apps using common libraries, e.g., for advertisements.
5.7 Individual Case Studies
We now report individual case studies to illustrate the nature of our ndings.
Advertising Libraries. During the evaluation, we discovered an advertising library,
used by 353 of 4,997 applications, which implements a Webview exposing many sen-
sitive interface methods. In particular, a successful JavaScript injection would allow
an attacker to perform dierent actions, including downloading/saving of pictures,
sending email or SMS by manipulating Intents, playing audio or videos on the vic-
tim’s phone, opening new applications, creating calendar events, and posting to social
networks.
Another library, used by 1,507 applications, allows an attacker to start new applica-
tions on the phone, controlling the Intent extras provided to the Activity.
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Game App. Among our results, we found a game application (“SwingAid Level
up Golf”) that uses several Webviews and JavaScript interfaces leading to dierent
alarms: SQL-lite leaks via preferences, frame confusion, and telephony manager Leaks.
Moreover, we discovered the value loginPwd among preferences keys accessible from
a JavaScript interface. We were able to manually conrm all alarms as true positives.
Interface methods accessible when creating an account creation within the game
include getAccountEmail, getPhoneNumber, and getUserPwd. We successfully performed
a man-in-the-middle attack and injected JavaScript to access all three methods. The
account e-email and phone number are accessible immediately upon attempting to
create an account. The password is stored in a local database, cached in the preferences
and accessible with the loginPwd key. When the user visits the account creation page a
second time, the password can be stolen via the interface method.
The underlying problem is twofold and representative for many Webview vulnera-
bilities: rst, the Webview loads data via an insecure channel, and second, the JavaScript
interface makes sensitive data available (a plaintext password). Even if the password
would otherwise not be sent via the insecure channel, a JavaScript injection attack is
able to retrieve it through the interface and extract it directly. Since our discovery, all
issues have been resolved in a newer version of the application (version 2.6).
6 Limitations and Discussion
Avoiding Instrumentation In principle, we could avoid instrumenting the applica-
tion by summarizing interface methods with an interprocedural taint analysis. However,
to achieve the same precision, the analysis would have to be computationally expensive:
on method entry, any reachable eld in any reachable object (not just arguments of the
interface method) would have to be treated as carrying individual taint. On method
exit, the eects on all reachable elds would have to stored, before resolving the eects
among all interface method summaries. Our instrumentation-based approach not only
avoids this cost, but also allows us to factor out ow analysis into a separate tool, a
design choice that improves robustness and maintainability.
Analysis Limitations Our system, together with the underlying ow analysis, is
subject to common limitations of static analysis and hence can fail to detect Webviews
and interfaces instantiated via native code, reection, or dynamic code loading. In
principle, this currently allows a developer intent on doing so to hide sensitive JavaScript
APIs. However, we focus on benign software and vulnerabilities that are honest mistakes
rather than planted backdoors. Still, we note that BabelView would automatically benet
from future ow analyses that may counteract evasion techniques.
A potential source of false positives is that BabelView does not distinguish Webview
instances of the same type and will conservatively join the JavaScript interfaces of all
instances. Furthermore, our analysis loses precision when reporting indirect leaks via
Preferences or Bundle. As mentioned in §4.4, we connect sensitive ows into the appli-
cation preferences with ows from the preferences to the instrumented sink method
in BabelView. While this is sound and will conservatively capture any information
leaks via preferences, it is not taking into account any temporal dependencies between
storing and retrieving the value. A dierent treatment of this would be a potential
source of false negatives, since preferences persist across application restarts.
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Attack Feasibility In our feasibility analysis, we actively try to inject JavaScript
code into a Webview, aiming at identifying whether the reported interface object is
present in the Webview. The presence of the interface object means that all its interface
methods are available to use, including the one BabelView reported. However, we do
not actively invoke these methods and thus we cannot be sure of their exploitability.
Mitigating Potential Vulnerabilities To avoid giving potential attackers control
over sensitive data and functionality, developers can follow a set of design principles.
First of all, Webview contents should be exclusively loaded via a secure channel. Second,
as mentioned in the Android developer documentation, Webviews should only load
trusted contents. External links have to be opened with the default browser. For also
protecting against malicious ads or cross-site-scripting attacks, JavaScript interfaces
should oer an absolute minimum of functionality and avoid arguments as far as
possible. Finally, recent work also introduced novel mechanisms to enforce policies on
hybrid applications (see §7.2).
7 Related Work
We now review work on vulnerabilities and attacks against Webview (§7.1), dis-
cuss related work on policies and access control (§7.2), and contrast with work on
instrumentation-based modeling (§7.3).
7.1 Webview: Attacks and Vulnerabilities
Webview vulnerabilities have been widely studied [4, 6, 15–17, 20]. Luo et al. give a
detailed overview of several classes of attacks against Webviews [15], providing a basis
for our work. Neugschwandtner et al. [20] were the rst to highlight the magnitude
of the problem. In their analysis, they categorize as vulnerable all applications imple-
menting JavaScript interfaces and misusing TLS (or not using it at all). For further
precision, they analyzed permissions and discovered that 76% of vulnerable applica-
tions requested privacy critical permissions. While this is a sign of poorly designed
applications, the impact of an injection exploit very much depends on the JavaScript
interfaces, motivating the work of this paper.
A step forward towards this was made by Bifocals [6], a static analysis tool able to
identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in Webviews. Bifocals looks for potential Webview
vulnerabilities (using JavaScript interfaces and loading third party web pages) and
then performs an impact analysis on the JavaScript interfaces. In particular, it analyzes
whether these methods reach code requiring security-relevant permissions. However,
JavaScript interfaces can pose an (application-specic) risk without making use of
permissions. At the same time, not all JavaScript interfaces that make use of permissions
are dangerous: for example, an interface method might use the phone’s IMEI to perform
an operation but not return it to the caller.
The means by which malicious code can be injected into the Webview have been
discussed in previous work [9, 10]. Having to interact with many forms of entities,
HTML5-based hybrid applications expose a broader surface of attack, introducing new
vectors of injection for cross-site-scripting attacks [10]. While these attacks require
the user to directly visit the malicious page within the Webview, Web-to-Application
injection attacks (W2AI) rely on intent hyperlinks to render the payload simply by
clinking a link in the default browser [9]. Both discuss the threat behind JavaScript
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interfaces, but stop their analysis at the moment where the malicious payload is loaded,
without analyzing the implication of the attacker executing the JavaScript interfaces.
A large scale study on mobile web applications and their vulnerabilities was pre-
sented by Mutchler et al. [17], but did not study the nature of the exposed JavaScript
interfaces. Li et al. [14] studied a new category of shing attacks called Cross-App Web-
View infection. This new type of attacks exploits the possibility of issuing navigation
requests from one app’s Webview to another via Intent deep linking and other URL
schemata. This can trigger a chain of requests to a set of infected apps.
Most closely related to our work is the concurrently developed BridgeScope [31],
a tool to assess JavaScript interfaces based on a custom static analysis. Similar to our
work, BridgeScope allows to detect potential ows to and from interface methods.
BridgeScope uses a custom ow analysis, whereas our approach intentionally allows
to reuse state-of-art ow analysis tools. While BridgeScope’s ow analysis performs
well on benchmarks, there appears to be no specic treatment of Map-like objects such
as Preferences of Bundle.
In recent work, Yang et al. [29] have combined the information of a deep static
analysis with a selective symbolic execution to actively exploit event handlers in
Android hybrid applications. In OSV-Hunter [30], they introduce a new approach to
detect Origin Stripping Vulnerabilities. These type of vulnerabilities persist when upon
invocation of window.postMessage, it is not possible to distinguish the identity of the
message sender or even safely obtain the source origin. This is inherently true for
Hybrid applications, where developers often rely on JavaScript interfaces to ll the gap
between web and the native platform.
7.2 Webview Access Control
There have been several proposals to bring origin-based access control to Webviews [8,
23, 26]. Shehab et al. [23] proposed a framework that modies Cordova, enabling
developers to build and enforce a page-based plugin access policy. In this way, depending
on the page loaded, it will or will not have the permission to use exposed Cordova
plugins (i.e., JavaScript interfaces).
Georgiev et al. presented NoFrank [8], a system to extend origin-based access control
to local resources outside the web browser. In particular, the application developer
whitelists origins that are then allowed to access device’s resources. However, once
an origin is white-listed, it can access any resource exposed. Jin et al. [11] propose a
ne-granular solution in a system that allows developers to assign dierent permissions
to dierent frames in the Webview.
Tuncay et al. [26] increase granularity further in their Draco system. Draco denes
a policy language that developers can use to design access control policies on dierent
channels, i.e. the interface object, the event handlers and the HTML5 API. Another
framework allowing developers to dene security policies is HybridGuard [21]. Dier-
ently from Draco, HybridGuard has been entirely developed in JavaScript, making it
platform independent and easy to deploy on dierent platform and hybrid development
framework. Both Draco and HybridGuard could provide an interesting solution to the
problem of securing an interface BabelView is rising an alarm for, without unduly
restricting its functionality.
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7.3 Instrumentation-based Modeling
Synthesizing code to trigger specic function interfaces is not a new problem and traces
back to generating verication harnesses, e.g., for software model checking [3, 12]. On
Android, FlowDroid [2] uses a model that invokes callbacks in a “dummy main” method,
taking into account the life cycle of Android activities. While the problems share some
similarity, JavaScript interfaces and Webviews are inherently varied and app-specic.
Therefore, we require a static analysis and cannot rely on xed signatures. Furthermore,
because our model represents an attacker instead of a well-dened system, calls can
appear out of context anytime web content can be loaded in the Webview, i.e., after a
loadUrl-like method.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel method to use information ow analysis to eval-
uate the possible impact of code injection attacks against mobile applications with
Webviews. The key idea of our approach is to model the possible eects of injected
malicious JavaScript code at the Java level, thereby avoiding any direct reasoning about
JavaScript semantics. In particular, this allowed us to rely on a robust state-of-the-art
implementation of taint analysis for Android.
We implemented our approach in BabelView, and evaluated it on 25,000 applications,
conrming its practical applicability and at the same time reporting on the state of
Webview security in Android. With BabelView, we found 10,808 potential vulnerabilities
in 4,997 applications, aecting more than 3 billion users. We validated our results on a
subset of applications where we achieved a precision of 81% at a recall of 89% when
measured per alarm, or a precision of 90% and a recall of 100% when measured per
application.
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